Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
- Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
- School choice with vouchers
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- An advanced parking navigation system for downtown parking
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- College admissions with tuition transfers
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
- Bipartite choices
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Essentially stable matchings
- University rankings from the revealed preferences of the applicants
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
- Manipulability in school choice
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- A stable marriage requires communication
- Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- ReGale: some memorable results
- My encounters with David Gale
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
- A task-allocation problem
- A dynamic school choice model
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School choice: an experimental study
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- How well do structural demand models work? Counterfactual predictions in school choice
- Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
- Menu mechanisms
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- The two-sided matching problem. Origin, development and current issues
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- On classical and modern marriage problems
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
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