A dynamic school choice model

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.011zbMath1281.91126OpenAlexW2036640432MaRDI QIDQ2435894

Juan Sebastián Pereyra

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/83766/

zbMATH Keywords

school choicedeferred acceptance algorithmdynamic matchingoverlapping agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment, Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms, Non-vetoed matching with status quo, Reallocation with priorities, A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties, On the operation of multiple matching markets, Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets, Influencing waiting lists, Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program, Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice, Gradual college admission, Monge Properties, Optimal Greedy Policies, and Policy Improvement for the Dynamic Stochastic Transportation Problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Markovian assignment rules
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Dynamic Kidney Exchange
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage