A dynamic school choice model
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Publication:2435894
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Cites work
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Cited in
(23)- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Influencing waiting lists
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Gradual college admission
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Self-selection in school choice
- Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Monge properties, optimal greedy policies, and policy improvement for the dynamic stochastic transportation problem
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
- A computational approach to the multi-period many-to-one matching with ties
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- Non-vetoed matching with status quo
- Reallocation with priorities
- Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
- A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
- Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
- Gradual matching with affirmative action
- Waitlist engineering in discrete object allocations with outside option
- Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
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