Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2138086
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105441zbMath1490.91142arXiv1812.11297OpenAlexW4221053087MaRDI QIDQ2138086
M. Bumin Yenmez, Fuhito Kojima, Isa E. Hafalir
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.11297
Related Items (3)
Matching through institutions ⋮ Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms ⋮ Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions
Cites Work
- Assignment problems with complementarities
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- A simple characterization of responsive choice
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- A dynamic school choice model
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms
- General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
- Common enrollment in school choice
- Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
- Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
This page was built for publication: Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
