School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
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Publication:406428
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.004zbMath1309.91102OpenAlexW2116188555WikidataQ57990804 ScholiaQ57990804MaRDI QIDQ406428
Muhammed A. Yildirim, M. Bumin Yenmez, Isa E. Hafalir, Lars Ehlers
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/13-2011-cah.pdf
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