School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
From MaRDI portal
Publication:406428
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.004zbMATH Open1309.91102OpenAlexW2116188555WikidataQ57990804 ScholiaQ57990804MaRDI QIDQ406428FDOQ406428
Muhammed A. Yildirim, M. Bumin Yenmez, Isa E. Hafalir, Lars Ehlers
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/13-2011-cah.pdf
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
- School Choice with Consent*
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
Cited In (61)
- Efficient matching under general constraints
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Budget-feasible mechanisms for proportionally selecting agents from groups
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
- Stability vs. no justified envy
- Graduate admission with financial support
- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix
- College admissions with tuition transfers
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- On lexicographic choice
- Stability of an allocation of objects
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Improving the Chilean College Admissions System
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Constrained random matching
- Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
- Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
- School choice with hybrid schedules
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Matching through institutions
- Menu mechanisms
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Constrained school choice
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- School choice with preference rank classes
- On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
This page was built for publication: School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q406428)
