Responsive affirmative action in school choice

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.04.007MaRDI QIDQ308606zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Battal Doğan

Publication date 6 September 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.007

zbMATH Keywords

affirmative actionschool choiceminimal responsiveness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
• School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
• Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods
• On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
• School Choice with Consent^*
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• Truncation strategies in matching markets
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems

Cited in

(17)

• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
• School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
• Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves
• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
• Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
• Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
• Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
• On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
• Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
• School choice with preference rank classes
• On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
• Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based
• A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
• When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
• Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study

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