Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
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Publication:4586048
Recommendations
- Priority matchings revisited
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- The power of choice in priority scheduling
- Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets
- A Game-Theoretic Approach to Deciding Higher-Order Matching
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem
Cited in
(43)- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- On lexicographic choice
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability
- Graduate admission with financial support
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Matching through institutions
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- On capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves
- Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
- Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- College admissions with budget complementarities
- Gradual matching with affirmative action
- Market design with deferred acceptance: a recipe for characterizations
- Meritocracy versus diversity
- Widening access in university admissions
- Optimal top-n policy
- A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules
- Asylum assignment and burden-sharing
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
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