On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
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Publication:508382
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.12.005zbMATH Open1400.91374OpenAlexW2191631169MaRDI QIDQ508382FDOQ508382
Authors: Daisuke Hirata, Yusuke Kasuya 
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/27590/070econDP15-10.pdf
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efficiencystabilityuniquenessmatching with contractsstrategy-proofnessirrelevance of rejected contracts
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- School Choice with Consent*
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
Cited In (20)
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability
- Graduate admission with financial support
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Matching With Complementary Contracts
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
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