Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
From MaRDI portal
Publication:900445
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.015zbMATH Open1330.91118OpenAlexW1913029399MaRDI QIDQ900445FDOQ900445
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.015
embeddingmatching with contractssubstitutesbilateral substitutesunilateral substitutesmatching with salaries
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
Cited In (6)
- Matching With Complementary Contracts
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
This page was built for publication: Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q900445)
