Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.015MaRDI QIDQ900445zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jan Christoph Schlegel

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.015

zbMATH Keywords

embeddingmatching with contractssubstitutesbilateral substitutesunilateral substitutesmatching with salaries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• Cumulative offer process is order-independent
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Microeconomic theory
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
• On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts

Cited in

(11)

• Matching With Complementary Contracts
• Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program
• Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching
• Matching with partially ordered contracts
• On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
• Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
• Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
• Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
• Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers

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