Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.015zbMath1330.91118OpenAlexW1913029399MaRDI QIDQ900445

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.015

zbMATH Keywords

embeddingsubstitutesmatching with contractsbilateral substitutesunilateral substitutesmatching with salaries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms, On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts, Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching, Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Cites Work

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