On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.011zbMATH Open1279.91122OpenAlexW2018543046MaRDI QIDQ765218FDOQ765218

Authors: R. Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo 

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/12444

Recommendations

• On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcore

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Ordered sets
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
• What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory

Cited In (5)

• On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
• WARP and combinatorial choice
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result

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