WARP and combinatorial choice
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Publication:1693195
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.007zbMath1400.91125OpenAlexW2769974113MaRDI QIDQ1693195
Publication date: 11 January 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.007
path independenceweak axiom of revealed preferencerationalizabilityirrelevance of rejected contractscombinatorial choice
Related Items (5)
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms ⋮ Rationalizable choice functions ⋮ Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice
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