Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
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Publication:2415985
Recommendations
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- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
Cites work
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
- Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incentives in Teams
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- On cores and indivisibility
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- School choice under partial fairness
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- WARP and combinatorial choice
Cited in
(21)- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- Obvious manipulations
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Improving PARMA trailing
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Essentially stable matchings
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
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