Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
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Publication:2415985
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.01.004zbMATH Open1411.91330OpenAlexW2915182042WikidataQ128347722 ScholiaQ128347722MaRDI QIDQ2415985FDOQ2415985
Publication date: 23 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.004
Recommendations
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
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- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies
strategy-proofnessschool choicepivotal mechanismPareto-improvementPareto-constrained participation-maximality
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- On cores and indivisibility
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Incentives in Teams
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- School choice under partial fairness
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
Cited In (21)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- Obvious manipulations
- There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
- Improving PARMA trailing
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Essentially stable matchings
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