School choice with transferable student characteristics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6148575
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.007zbMath1530.91443MaRDI QIDQ6148575
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, Antonio Romero-Medina
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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