A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.10.002MaRDI QIDQ472219zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qianfeng Tang, Jingsheng Yu

Publication date 19 November 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

matchingschool choicePareto efficiencydeferred acceptance algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• School Choice with Consent^*
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
• School choice under partial fairness
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences

Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited in

(25)

• Decentralized college admissions under single application
• School Choice with Consent^*
• The core of school choice problems
• A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
• A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
• Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
• Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
• Efficient matching under general constraints
• Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
• School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
• School choice with transferable student characteristics
• Fair student placement
• Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
• Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
• Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
• Influence in private-goods allocation
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• Epsilon-stability in school choice
• New axioms for top trading cycles
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
• Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
• Essentially stable matchings

This page was built for publication: A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q472219)