A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
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Publication:472219
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.10.002zbMath1309.91103OpenAlexW2030910507MaRDI QIDQ472219
Publication date: 19 November 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.002
Related Items (20)
Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Essentially stable matchings ⋮ Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics ⋮ Epsilon-stability in school choice ⋮ The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Fair student placement ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods ⋮ School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution ⋮ Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
Cites Work
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School Choice with Consent*
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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