A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
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Publication:472219
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.10.002zbMATH Open1309.91103OpenAlexW2030910507MaRDI QIDQ472219FDOQ472219
Authors: Qianfeng Tang, Jingsheng Yu 
Publication date: 19 November 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.002
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Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On cores and indivisibility
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- School Choice with Consent*
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
Cited In (25)
- The core of school choice problems
- School Choice with Consent*
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- Efficient matching under general constraints
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- Fair student placement
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
- Essentially stable matchings
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