Decentralized college admissions under single application

DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00241-4zbMATH Open1483.91134OpenAlexW3120344594MaRDI QIDQ826044FDOQ826044

Authors: Somouaoga Bonkoungou 

Publication date: 18 December 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00241-4

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zbMATH Keywords

refinementdeferred acceptancesubgame perfect equilibriumdecentralized marketcollege admission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• School Choice with Consent^*
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Order independent equilibria
• Constrained school choice
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
• Decentralized job matching
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
• Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability

Cited In (5)

• A college admissions clearinghouse
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
• Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
• Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago

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