Decentralized college admissions under single application
From MaRDI portal
Publication:826044
DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00241-4zbMATH Open1483.91134OpenAlexW3120344594MaRDI QIDQ826044FDOQ826044
Publication date: 18 December 2021
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00241-4
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- School Choice with Consent*
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Order independent equilibria
- Constrained school choice
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- Decentralized job matching
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: Decentralized college admissions under single application
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q826044)
