The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1zbMATH Open0594.90002OpenAlexW1985899049WikidataQ56564680 ScholiaQ56564680MaRDI QIDQ1077313FDOQ1077313

Authors: Alvin E. Roth 

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1

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zbMATH Keywords

college admissions problemtrue preferencesdominant strategytwo-sided matching marketsstable matching procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• Group robust stability in matching markets
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
• On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• Optimal truncation in matching markets
• Enrollment manipulations in school choice
• Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
• Manipulation via capacities revisited
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets
• Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues
• Profit-maximizing matchmaker
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• Protective behavior in matching models
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
• The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
• Random matching in the college admissions problem
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Congestion games with capacitated resources
• Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Decentralized job matching
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
• Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
• Median stable matching for college admissions
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
• Essentially stable matchings
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• Entering classes in the college admissions model
• Decentralized college admissions under single application
• Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
• Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
• Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
• Gradual college admission
• College admissions with tuition transfers
• Incentives in landing slot problems
• Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
• Market Design
• Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
• Fair and efficient student placement with couples
• Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• Dorm augmented college assignments
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Constitutions and groups
• Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
• Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
• Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting

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