The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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Recommendations
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- A further note on the college admission game
- Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Gradual college admission
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- College admissions with tuition transfers
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- Market Design
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- Manipulation via capacities revisited
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
- Dorm augmented college assignments
- Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Constitutions and groups
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Protective behavior in matching models
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- An impossibility theorem for matching problems
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Sufficient conditions making lexicographic rules over the power set satisfy extensibility
- Iterative voting and acyclic games
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Bipartite choices
- Non-cooperative matching games
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Mutually best matches
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Congestion games with capacitated resources
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
- One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- Preference extension rules for ranking sets of alternatives with a fixed cardinality
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
- Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Decentralized job matching
- The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
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