The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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Recommendations
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- A further note on the college admission game
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- Market Design
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Sufficient conditions making lexicographic rules over the power set satisfy extensibility
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Iterative voting and acyclic games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2028680 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets
- Gradual college admission
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model
- College admissions with tuition transfers
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
- An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability
- Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
- One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
- Mutually best matches
- A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
- Preference extension rules for ranking sets of alternatives with a fixed cardinality
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- The two-sided matching problem. Origin, development and current issues
- Dorm augmented college assignments
- Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- A further note on the college admission game
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
- Non-cooperative matching games
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Constitutions and groups
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Stable matching in large economies
- Bipartite choices
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
- The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- An impossibility theorem for matching problems
- Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
- A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Protective behavior in matching models
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Decentralized job matching
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Manipulation via capacities revisited
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
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