The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

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Cites work

College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited in

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Application fee manipulations in matching markets
Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Enrollment manipulations in school choice
Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
Group robust stability in matching markets
Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
Stable matchings and preferences of couples
Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
Protective behavior in matching models
The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues
On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
College admissions with affirmative action
Decentralized job matching
Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
Manipulation via capacities revisited
Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
Pairwise kidney exchange
Profit-maximizing matchmaker
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
The College Admissions Problem Revisited
Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
Essentially stable matchings
Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
Random matching in the college admissions problem
Local and global consistency properties for student placement
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
Congestion games with capacitated resources
Absorbing sets in roommate problems
Median stable matching for college admissions
The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
Matching markets under (in)complete information
Games of manipulation in marriage problems
The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
An analysis of the German university admissions system
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
Optimal truncation in matching markets
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
Market Design
The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
Sufficient conditions making lexicographic rules over the power set satisfy extensibility
Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
Iterative voting and acyclic games
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2028680 (Why is no real title available?)
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets
Gradual college admission
Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
Two-Sided Matching Models
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
Entering classes in the college admissions model
Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model
College admissions with tuition transfers
Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand

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