Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
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Publication:403704
DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0804-4zbMATH Open1307.91132OpenAlexW2009115598MaRDI QIDQ403704FDOQ403704
Authors: Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan 
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0804-4
Recommendations
acyclicityessential homogeneityfictitious studentslarge marketschool-optimal stable mechanismstudent-optimal stable mechanism
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Cited In (6)
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
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