Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0804-4MaRDI QIDQ403704zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date 29 August 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0804-4

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityessential homogeneityfictitious studentslarge marketschool-optimal stable mechanismstudent-optimal stable mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Marriage, honesty, and stability
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets

Cited in

(6)

• Enrollment manipulations in school choice
• Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
• The object allocation problem with random priorities
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems

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