Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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Publication:2431839
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0097-ZzbMATH Open1180.91024OpenAlexW1963564326MaRDI QIDQ2431839FDOQ2431839
Authors: Hideo Konishi, M. Utku Ünver 
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp515.pdf
Recommendations
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Cites Work
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- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
Cited In (24)
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Manipulation via capacities revisited
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments
- Capacity design in school choice
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Competition under different reimbursement systems: The concept of an internet-based hospital management game
- Interview hoarding
- Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- A further note on the college admission game
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
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