Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0097-ZMaRDI QIDQ2431839zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hideo Konishi, M. Utku Ünver

Publication date 24 October 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp515.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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• Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets

Cites work

• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1305096 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems

Cited in

(24)

• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments
• Incentives in landing slot problems
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
• When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
• Competition under different reimbursement systems: The concept of an internet-based hospital management game
• Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
• Enrollment manipulations in school choice
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
• Optimal truncation in matching markets
• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Interview hoarding
• Capacity design in school choice
• A further note on the college admission game
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
• Manipulation via capacities revisited

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