Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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Publication:2431839
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0097-zzbMath1180.91024OpenAlexW1963564326MaRDI QIDQ2431839
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp515.pdf
Related Items (20)
Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket ⋮ Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Optimal truncation in matching markets ⋮ The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ Manipulation via capacities revisited ⋮ When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
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