A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
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Publication:1350573
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1zbMath0875.90014MaRDI QIDQ1350573
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1
91B14: Social choice
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