Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(91)90017-NMaRDI QIDQ2641198zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Arunava Sen, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date 1991

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(91)90017-N

zbMATH Keywords

game formimplementationsocial choice correspondencesocial outcomesstrong Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

Let A be a set of social outcomes and N a finite set of voters. For every profile of preferences R, a social choice function f associates a choice set f(R). A game form G implements f in strong Nash equilibria if the set of strong Nash equilibria of G equals f(R) for every R. This paper gives sufficient conditions on A and f for such implementation.

Recommendations

• A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
• Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria

Cites work

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Subgame Perfect Implementation

Cited in

(26)

• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
• Weakly implementable social choice rules
• Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
• Coalition formation in games of fair division
• A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
• An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
• Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
• Implementation theory
• Implementation by mediated equilibrium
• Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
• Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard
• An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
• Implementability via protective equilibria

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