Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Epsilon-Nash implementation
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games
- The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- The revelation approach to Nash implementation
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Coalition-proof implementation
- Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
- Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Interactive implementation
- A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Coalition formation in games of fair division
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
- Nash implementation with a private good
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
- Implementation in generic environments
- Implementing a surplus division rule
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation in pure public good economies
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Optimal delay in committees
- Two-agent interactive implementation
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
- Constrained implementation
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Time and Nash implementation
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
- Implementation of voting operators
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Two-person ex post implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- Implementation with evidence
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Nash implementation in rationing problems with single-crossing preferences
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Implementation theory
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
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