Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
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Publication:1288245
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0642zbMath0918.90007MaRDI QIDQ1288245
Publication date: 4 August 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0642
91A12: Cooperative games
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B50: General equilibrium theory
91B14: Social choice
Cites Work
- Credible implementation
- Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms