Implementation via approval mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003zbMath1400.91158OpenAlexW2614721855MaRDI QIDQ2359385

Dimitrios Xefteris, Matías Núñez

Publication date: 28 June 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessCondorcet winnerapproval votingNash implementationsingle-peakedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (5)

On the implementation of the median ⋮ Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation ⋮ On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals ⋮ Strategic vote trading under complete information ⋮ Piercing numbers in approval voting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Handbook on approval voting
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
• Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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