On the implementation of the median
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Publication:2668985
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102595zbMATH Open1485.91053OpenAlexW3214642633MaRDI QIDQ2668985FDOQ2668985
Authors: Matías Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris, Carlos Pimienta 
Publication date: 9 March 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03498557/file/JME_revision%20%284%29.pdf
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strategy-proofnessNash implementationrobust implementationsingle-peaked preferencesBayesian implementationMedian rule
Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Optimal voting rules
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
Cited In (13)
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- On ``An improved algorithm for finding the median distributively
- Spatial implementation
- Computing the median with uncertainty
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIAN AS A FUSION OPERATOR
- The behavioral meaning of the median
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