Recommendations
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Voting under constraints
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
Cites work
- A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Bayesian Implementation
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Optimal voting rules
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
Cited in
(14)- On ``An improved algorithm for finding the median distributively
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Computing the median with uncertainty
- UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIAN AS A FUSION OPERATOR
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910857 (Why is no real title available?)
- The behavioral meaning of the median
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Proportionality-based fairness and strategyproofness in the facility location problem
- Spatial implementation
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
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