Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
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Publication:2272186
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0323-yzbMath1167.91337OpenAlexW1984042981MaRDI QIDQ2272186
Publication date: 6 August 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/325.pdf
Related Items (14)
Implementation via approval mechanisms ⋮ Single-plateaued choice ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness ⋮ Single-basined choice ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions ⋮ Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ A spatial analogue of May's theorem ⋮ A spatial analogue of May's theorem ⋮ Fuzzy politics. I: The genesis of parties ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
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