A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
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Publication:1331065
DOI10.1007/BF00193809zbMATH Open0823.90003OpenAlexW2009804024MaRDI QIDQ1331065FDOQ1331065
Authors: Matthew O. Jackson, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 18 August 1994
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00193809
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Cited In (55)
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities
- Upper set rules with binary ranges
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- The capacity constrained facility location problem
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Single-plateaued choice
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
- Voting under constraints
- Single-peaked choice
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- On the implementation of the median
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
- Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle
- Single-basined choice
- Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
- Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function
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