Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
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Publication:1293748
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Cited in
(16)- Strategy-proof location on a network
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies
- Fractional matching markets
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result
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