Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods

DOI10.1007/S001990050277zbMATH Open0942.91024OpenAlexW2076978348MaRDI QIDQ1293748FDOQ1293748

James Schummer

Publication date: 29 June 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050277

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zbMATH Keywords

lotteriespublic goodsstrategy-proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Public goods (91B18)

Cited In (14)

• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
• Strategy-proof location on a network
• A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
• Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
• Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
• Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
• Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
• The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
• The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Fractional matching markets

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