The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
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Publication:2291153
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.009zbMath1431.91249OpenAlexW2980854468WikidataQ127016728 ScholiaQ127016728MaRDI QIDQ2291153
Publication date: 30 January 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.009
Related Items (2)
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
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