Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
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Publication:1649093
DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1110-zzbMath1397.91301OpenAlexW2539856977MaRDI QIDQ1649093
Publication date: 5 July 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/probabilistic-assignment-an-extension-approach(afe0a8cd-4ff8-4c8d-a2fa-da99703945fe).html
Related Items (6)
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
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