The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
From MaRDI portal
Publication:980972
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.01.001zbMATH Open1230.91088OpenAlexW2063224664MaRDI QIDQ980972FDOQ980972
Authors: Özgür Yılmaz 
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/6282
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A theorem on flows in networks
- On cores and indivisibility
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Kidney Exchange
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Random assignment under weak preferences
Cited In (23)
- Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments
- An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- Constrained random matching
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
- On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Competitive equilibrium in the random assignment problem
This page was built for publication: The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q980972)
