The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.01.001MaRDI QIDQ980972zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Özgür Yılmaz

Publication date 8 July 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/6282

zbMATH Keywords

random assignmentordinal efficiencyno justified-envysimultaneous eating algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• A theorem on flows in networks
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• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Kidney Exchange
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• On cores and indivisibility
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Random assignment under weak preferences
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?

Cited in

(23)

• Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
• Trading probabilities along cycles
• Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
• Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
• Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
• Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments
• An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments
• Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
• The object allocation problem with random priorities
• Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
• An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Constrained random matching
• A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
• Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
• On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
• When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
• Competitive equilibrium in the random assignment problem

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