On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
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Publication:1680097
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.005zbMath1415.91180OpenAlexW2564676145MaRDI QIDQ1680097
Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver, Onur Kesten
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.005
probabilistic serial mechanismenvy-freenessassigning indivisible objectsincentive and invariance properties
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Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization ⋮ The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain ⋮ A characterization of the extended serial correspondence ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
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- On cores and indivisibility
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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