House allocation with fractional endowments
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Publication:637577
DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0251-9zbMATH Open1274.91328OpenAlexW2115894747MaRDI QIDQ637577FDOQ637577
Authors: Stergios Athanassoglou, Jay Sethuraman 
Publication date: 6 September 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24351/1/MPRA_paper_24351.pdf
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Cites Work
- Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
- On cores and indivisibility
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Random assignment under weak preferences
Cited In (25)
- Top trading cycles
- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Efficient lottery design
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments
- An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments
- Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents
- Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- Constrained random matching
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- On the consistency of random serial dictatorship
- Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
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