Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
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Publication:697840
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2813zbMath1021.91035OpenAlexW2039556126MaRDI QIDQ697840
Publication date: 17 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2813
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Voting by Committees
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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