The house allocation problem is stated as follows: \(n\) indivisible objects (houses) should be allocated to \(n\) agents with the condition that no one receives more than an object. The agents are equiped with preference relation over the set of objects. A mechanism (called allocation rule) assigns to each admissible preference profile an allocation. The author found the maximal domain where an allocation rule can be defined and satisfies efficiency and strategy-proofness. This domain consists of all preference profiles with the property that each agent ranks strictly descending the objects to a certain one and then, the indifference holds over this certain object and the remaining objects. The only allocation rules satisfying efficiency and strategy-proofness on the maximal domain are the ``mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules.
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