Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
From MaRDI portal
Publication:523519
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.006zbMath1409.91186OpenAlexW1591935357MaRDI QIDQ523519
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, Antonio Nicolò
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3227065
Related Items (8)
Constrained random matching ⋮ A one-sided many-to-many matching problem ⋮ The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange ⋮ Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem ⋮ How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences ⋮ Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
- Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Pairwise kidney exchange: comment
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- On cores and indivisibility
- Priority matchings revisited
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategyproof single unit award rules
- Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program
- Kidney Exchange
- Dynamic Kidney Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices
This page was built for publication: Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
