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- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Kidney Exchange
- On Representatives of Subsets
- On cores and indivisibility
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Paths, Trees, and Flowers
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
Cited in
(21)- Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
- Efficient and incentive-compatible liver exchange
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
- Dual-donor organ exchange
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Simulating the impact of crossover kidney transplantation on the Nord Italia transplant program
- Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values
- Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
- Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
- Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange
- The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
- Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
- The good Samaritan
- Kidney Exchange
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
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