Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2444699
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.007zbMath1296.91210OpenAlexW2015404795MaRDI QIDQ2444699
Publication date: 10 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/6185
Related Items (2)
A network model for minimizing the total organ transplant costs ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
- Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
- On certain classes of fractional matchings
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Matching theory
- Fractional matchings and the Edmonds-Gallai theorem
- Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program
- Kidney Exchange
- Dynamic Kidney Exchange
- Paths, Trees, and Flowers
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
This page was built for publication: Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange