Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.09.007MaRDI QIDQ2444699zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Özgür Yılmaz

Publication date 10 April 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/6185

zbMATH Keywords

Gallai-Edmonds decompositionkidney exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
• Kidney Exchange
• Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
• The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?
• Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

Cites work

• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Fractional matchings and the Edmonds-Gallai theorem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3220175 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3232667 (Why is no real title available?)
• Kidney Exchange
• Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
• Matching theory
• On certain classes of fractional matchings
• Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Paths, Trees, and Flowers
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange

Cited in

(9)

• A network model for minimizing the total organ transplant costs
• Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
• Untangling the Tuition Exchange program network
• Kidney Exchange
• Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
• Algorithms for kidney donation
• Mathematics of kidney exchange programmes
• Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
• Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism

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