Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.009MaRDI QIDQ665102zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Nicolò, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmarket designkidney exchangeprotective behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Kidney Exchange
• Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
• Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
• On cores and indivisibility
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Pairwise kidney exchange: comment
• Patient Choice in Kidney Allocation: A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Model
• Protective behavior in matching models
• Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(13)

• Maximising expectation of the number of transplants in kidney exchange programmes
• Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier
• Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
• Constrained random matching
• Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
• Kidney exchange programs with a priori crossmatch probing
• Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange
• Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
• A recourse policy to improve number of successful transplants in uncertain kidney exchange programs
• Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles
• Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
• Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
• Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange

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