Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
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Publication:665102
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.009zbMATH Open1279.91123OpenAlexW2134997704MaRDI QIDQ665102FDOQ665102
Authors: Antonio Nicolò, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez 
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009
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Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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- Kidney Exchange
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- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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- Patient Choice in Kidney Allocation: A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Model
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Pairwise kidney exchange: comment
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Protective behavior in matching models
Cited In (11)
- Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Constrained random matching
- Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange
- Maximising expectation of the number of transplants in kidney exchange programmes
- A recourse policy to improve number of successful transplants in uncertain kidney exchange programs
- Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange
- Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program
- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
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