Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ018zbMath1460.91167OpenAlexW2943502439MaRDI QIDQ5856521

J. Kratz, Tommy Andersson

Publication date: 26 March 2021

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz018

zbMATH Keywords

market designimmunosuppressantspairwise kidney exchangeblood group incompatibilityhalf-compatibility priority matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Medical applications (general) (92C50) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation with outside option ⋮ A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list ⋮ Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints ⋮ Organ donation with vouchers ⋮ How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange ⋮ IP solutions for international kidney exchange programmes ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences ⋮ Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program

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