A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
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Publication:6156344
DOI10.1007/S10058-022-00292-9zbMATH Open1518.91171MaRDI QIDQ6156344FDOQ6156344
Authors: Rohan Chowdhury 
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
- Stable matchings with ties, master preference lists, and matroid constraints
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- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
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- On the Induced Matching Problem
- On the induced matching problem
- On induced matchings
- An extension of matching theory
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- Stable marriage and indifference
- The structure of stable marriage with indifference
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier
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