Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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Publication:4682760
DOI10.3982/TE2201zbMath1396.91327MaRDI QIDQ4682760
Publication date: 19 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
matchingPareto efficiencygroup strategy-proofnesssingle-unit demandno-transfer allocation and exchange
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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