Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
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Publication:2681500
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.004OpenAlexW3086604347MaRDI QIDQ2681500
Publication date: 3 February 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.05311
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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