Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
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Publication:290170
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001zbMath1347.91171OpenAlexW1491181859MaRDI QIDQ290170
Publication date: 1 June 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001
strategy-proofnessdeferred-acceptance-algorithmindivisible objects allocationpopulation-monotonicityresource-monotonicity
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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