Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.001zbMATH Open1347.91171OpenAlexW1491181859MaRDI QIDQ290170FDOQ290170
Publication date: 1 June 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001
strategy-proofnessdeferred-acceptance-algorithmindivisible objects allocationpopulation-monotonicityresource-monotonicity
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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Cited In (20)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Capacity design in school choice
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Reallocation with priorities
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
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