Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

DOI10.1007/S001820400177MaRDI QIDQ1767476zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus

Publication date 11 March 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400177

zbMATH Keywords

Indivisible objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(37)

• Monotonicity and envyfree assignments
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
• On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
• A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
• Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
• Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
• Overlapping multiple object assignments
• Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Fair and efficient student placement with couples
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Unanimity and resource monotonicity
• Efficient priority rules
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• On reachable assignments in cycles
• House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• Resource allocation with partial responsibilities for initial endowments
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Algorithms and Computation
• House allocation with fractional endowments
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
• Packaging for allocation
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
• A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
• Consistent house allocation

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