Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

DOI10.1007/S001820400177MaRDI QIDQ1767476zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus

Publication date 11 March 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400177

zbMATH Keywords

Indivisible objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(36)

• Unanimity and resource monotonicity
• A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
• Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
• Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Fair and efficient student placement with couples
• A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
• House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly
• Monotonicity and envyfree assignments
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
• Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
• Overlapping multiple object assignments
• Consistent house allocation
• Efficient priority rules
• Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
• House allocation with fractional endowments
• Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Packaging for allocation
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Algorithms and Computation
• On reachable assignments in cycles
• Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Resource allocation with partial responsibilities for initial endowments
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities

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