Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
In this paper the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible comodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences is considered. \textit{W. Thomsen} [Soc. Choice Welfare 11, No. 3, 205--223 (1994; Zbl 0834.90006)], \textit{T. Sönmez} [Econ. Lett. 46, No. 3, 229--236 (1994; Zbl 0875.90009)] and \textit{H. Moulin} [J. Econ. Theory 84, No. 1, 41--72 (1999; Zbl 0917.90027)] introduced three different resource-monotonicity conditions. Under Pareto-optimality, the three resource-monotonicoty conditions are equivalent. It is investigated whether the interchange of these conditions still yields a valid characterization, and when the characterization still holds, whether it is a tight result or not. It is strengthened each of the results, that is, either the used resource-monotonicity condition can be replaced by a weaker one, or by using of another resource-monotonicity condition, the result is not tight. The main result of the paper is that when at least three agents are present, the class of fixed-path rationing methods is characterized by weak one-sided resource-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and consistency.
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- On fixed-path rationing methods.
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- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- The division problem under constraints
- The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Unanimity and resource monotonicity
- More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
- Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: an axiomatic analysis
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
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