Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked

DOI10.1007/s001990100204zbMath1038.91058OpenAlexW2158517024MaRDI QIDQ1865192

Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 25 March 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100204

zbMATH Keywords

individual preferencesresource-monotonicityfixed-path rationing methodssingle-peaked

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Secure implementation in allotment economies ⋮ One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule ⋮ Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions ⋮ Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources ⋮ The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality ⋮ Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ The division problem under constraints

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