Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01276-yzbMath1479.91236OpenAlexW2766739716MaRDI QIDQ2059051

Eun Jeong Heo, Youngsub Chun, Sung Hoon Hong

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/VUECON-17-00012.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitymaximalityPareto efficiencykidney exchangeimmunosuppressantspairwise cycles and chains solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Medical applications (general) (92C50) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints ⋮ How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange

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