School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
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Publication:423742
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.03.003zbMATH Open1239.91039OpenAlexW1990764606MaRDI QIDQ423742FDOQ423742
Authors: Fuhito Kojima 
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.003
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Cites Work
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Cited In (43)
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- Market Design
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- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
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- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions
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- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
- Matching through institutions
- Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
- Improving the Chilean college admissions system
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- Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based
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- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
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