School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
From MaRDI portal
Publication:423742
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.003zbMath1239.91039OpenAlexW1990764606MaRDI QIDQ423742
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.003
Related Items
Improving the Chilean College Admissions System, Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas, When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?, Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment, Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application, Responsive affirmative action in school choice, Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice, Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case, Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools, Matching through institutions, Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments, Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms, School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds, Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation, Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves, Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based, Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions, Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis, Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints, Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints, Market Design, Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy, Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution, The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment, School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution, Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas, Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis, Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice, On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action, Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case, Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints, Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers, Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants, Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study, On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice, Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity, Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution, A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice, Dynamic reserves in matching markets
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- On cores and indivisibility
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- College admissions with affirmative action
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
