School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- On cores and indivisibility
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Cited in
(52)- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
- Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Matching through institutions
- Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Assessing the potential impact of a nationwide class-based affirmative action system
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Affirmative action and school choice
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Improving the Chilean college admissions system
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
- Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
- Market Design
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves
- Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based
- Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions
- Transparent matching mechanisms
- Market design with distributional objectives: efficiency, incentives, and property rights
- Quota implementation in assignment games
- Market design with deferred acceptance: a recipe for characterizations
- Meritocracy versus diversity
- Matching with transfers under distributional constraints
- Optimal top-n policy
- A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
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