Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
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Publication:2409677
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Cites work
- \(M\)-convex function on generalized polymatroid
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Classified stable matching
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- House allocation with existing tenants
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5873618 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Making just school assignments
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(14)- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints
- Stable fractional matchings
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
- Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
- Minimal-access rights in school choice and the deferred acceptance mechanism
- Formal verification and synthesis of mechanisms for social choice
- Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism
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