Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
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Publication:944257
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0287-3zbMath1151.91663MaRDI QIDQ944257
Publication date: 15 September 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0287-3
Related Items
Enrollment manipulations in school choice, Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted, Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities, Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
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