Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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Publication:1036602
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.01.007zbMATH Open1180.91211OpenAlexW2142558139MaRDI QIDQ1036602FDOQ1036602
John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007
matchingstabilitymatching with contractsstrategy-proofnesslaw of aggregate demandgroup strategy-proofnesssubstitutes
Cites Work
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- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
Cited In (29)
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Matching With Complementary Contracts
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Menu mechanisms
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- On the number of employed in the matching model
- Popular matchings with weighted voters
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
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