Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007zbMath1180.91211OpenAlexW2142558139MaRDI QIDQ1036602

John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingstrategy-proofnesssubstitutesmatching with contractslaw of aggregate demandgroup strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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