Influence in private-goods allocation

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.04.001MaRDI QIDQ776963zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Madhav Raghavan

Publication date 13 July 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

matching with contractsstrategy-proofnessnon-bossinesshousing marketsprivate-goods allocationsingle-object auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Non-bossiness
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
• Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
• Strategyproof single unit award rules

Cites work

• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
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• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Incentives in Teams
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Non-bossiness
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• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• The solidarity axiom for quasilinear social choice problems

Cited in

(2)

• Non-bossiness
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 857689 (Why is no real title available?)

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