Influence in private-goods allocation
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.04.001zbMATH Open1437.91238OpenAlexW2908915304MaRDI QIDQ776963FDOQ776963
Publication date: 13 July 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.04.001
Recommendations
matching with contractsstrategy-proofnessnon-bossinesshousing marketsprivate-goods allocationsingle-object auctions
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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