Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure

DOI10.3982/ECTA11070zbMath1419.91140OpenAlexW1843393153MaRDI QIDQ4615869

Frédéric Koessler, Jeanne Hagenbach, Eduardo Perez-Richet

Publication date: 29 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11070

zbMATH Keywords

deliberationsupermodular gamesinformation disclosurestrategic communicationbelief consistencymasquerade relationhard informationsingle crossing differences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (20)

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